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WILSON, et al. (rival land 
claimants) 
v. 





OMAHA INDIAN TRIBE & UNITED 
STATES 
~ -










RGP, INC., et al. (rival land claimants) 
v. 




1. SUMMARY: Petrs in these consolidated cases challenge a ruling 
by the CA 8 that reverses a DC judgment quieting title in petrs to 2900 
acres of Iowa farmland on the east bank of the Missouri River. The 
effect of this reversal is to transfer this land to the United States 
as trustee and to the Omaha Indian Tribe whose reservation lies on the 
opposite side of the river. The United States and the Tribe claim that 
a 
the land is/part of the reservation transferred to the Iowa side of the 
river by avulsive actions. Petrs to the contrary contend that the land 
is accretion to the Iowa riparian land or to the part of the bed of the 
V"" 
river owned by the State of Iowa. The CA 8 held that neither petrs nor 
. 
resps had proved accretion or avulsion, but that 25 u.s.c. § 194 put --
the burden of proof on petrs and therefore judgment had to be for resps. 
Petrs variously attack § 194 as a violation of their Fifth Amendment 
right to due process, as erroneously applied under the facts of these 
cases, and as improperly extended to cover the State of Iowa. They also 
challenge the CA 8's application of federal and not state common law 
with regard to accretion and avulsion, and claim that even if federal 
common law was the appropriate standard, it was improperly applied here. 
2. FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: In March of 1854 the United States 
( 
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entered into a treaty with the Omaha Indian Tribe. By the terms of 
that treaty certain land located in an area known as Blackbird Bend 
was reserved by the Tribe, which ceded to the United States all other 
land west of the center of the main channel of the Missouri River. At 
the time of the treaty the reserved land within Blackbird Bend was 
located on the west side of the Missouri River. By 1923, however, the 
river had moved more than two miles to the west of its 1854 position. 
Petrs asserted before the DC and CA 8 that early movements of the Missour : 
River had washed away much of the land within the original Blackbird Bend 
area, and that the lands now claimed by the Tribe on the east side of 
the Missouriwerethe product of soil that had accreted to the Iowa riparic 
land. It therefore was not the same land that the Indians had obtained by 
treaty. 
From the 1940's petrs and their predecessors had occupied and 
cultivated the land in dispute. In April of 1975, with the assistance 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and with the approval of the United 
States, the Tribe seized possession of the land and is now farming it. 
In conjunction with the United States, it also brought suit in the DC 
to establish its title to the land. Petrs counterclaimed to quiet 
title in their names. 
The DC found that the Tribe and the United States had failed to 
prove that the river movements were controlled by the doctrine of 
avulsion and held that the river had changed by reason of the erosion 
of reservation land and accretion to Iowa riparian land. The CA reversed . 
The areas of disagreement between the CA and DC are as follows: 
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A. Choice of Law: The DC applied Nebraska law in evaluating the 
facts of the case. The Tribe and the government asserted that federal 
law controlled. Although the general rule is that state law determines 
the ownership of the banks and shore of waterways, the rule is subject 
to the caveat that a body of federal common law has developed to deter-
mine the effect of a change in the bed of a stream or river that forms 
an interstate boundary. See, ~, Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. 
Corvallis Sand & Gravel co., 429 U.S. 363, 375 (1977). Federal common 
law is applicable even if a single state is involved in a controversy 
with a private party, as long as the interests of more than one state 
are sufficiently implicated in the potential outcome. Here, according 
\~ to theCA, the reservation's boundary necessarily concerned the inter-
. __.1 
state boundary between Nebraska and Iowa. Also the applicability of 
federal law was dictated by the involvement of a reservation boundary 
that was originally created by tFeaty. - See Oneida Indian Nation v. 
county of Oneida, 414 u.s. 661, 677 (1974). 
B. Burden of Proof: Section 194 of Title 25 of the United States 
Code provides: 
Trial of right of property7 burden of proof 
In all trials about the right of property in 
which an Indian may be a party on one side, and a 
white person on the other, the burden of proof 
shall rest upon the white person, whenever the 
Indian shall make out a presumption of title in 
himself from the fact of previous possession or 
ownership • 
{Emphasis added.) Section 194 was one of a number of prote~tive laws 




The DC held that § 194 was not applicable in the instant contro-
versy. It's reasoning apparently was that application of§ 194 would 
require the court to presume that the land originally occupied by the 
Indians was exactly the same land that is the subject of these cases. 
The CA disagreed, stating that the trial court's reasoning would 
eviscerate the § 194 statutory burden, because it could be overcome by 
a mere allegation that the Indian land had been destroyed by erosion. 
That an 1867 survey established that land in the area now under dispute 
belonged to the Tribe was sufficient to "make out a presumption of 
title • from the fact of previous possession or ownership." 
c. Merits: The CA then turned to the merits and the lore of 
accretion and avulsion. It reje9ted the trial cou~t's position that 
avulsion occurs only (1) when there is a sudden and erratic jump or 
movement of the thalweg (the navigable channel of a river) and (2) the 
land across which the thalweg m~ves remains identifiable. And viewing 
the evidence it concluded that petrs had only raised speculative infer-
ences that the thalweg moved by accretion rather than avulsion. There-
fore, under § 194 petrs had failed to meet their burden of proof and 
title vested in the Tribe. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
A. No. 78-160: Petrs' central contention is that § 194 is invidiou£ 
racial discriminaEion in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. The issue was only discussed in a footnote by the CA 
and was not discussed at all by the DCo The CA relied on the following 
I • 
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( passage from Morton v. Mancari, 417 u.s. 535, 554-55 (1974): 
,.,. 
On numerous occasions this Court specifically 
has upheld legislation that singles out Indians 
for particular and special treatment. This unique 
legal status is of long standing and its sources 
are diverse. As long as the special treatment 
can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of 
Congress• unique obligation toward the Indians, 
such legislative judgments will not be disturbed. 
(Citations omitted.) Petr claims that the CA 8 should have subjected 
§ 194 to strict scrutiny. 
Petrs also argue that the CA misconstrued § 194; it refers to 
individual Indians, not to tribes. Moreover, the CA construed § 194 
to apply to all non-Indians, whether states, corporations or individuals. 
Petrs cite an 1880 case of this Court where the term 11White person, .. 
as used in an Indian protection statute similar to § 194, was held not 
to include black persons. United States v. Perryman, 100 u.s. 235 
(1880). Also they claim that the Tribe has to prove avulsion before 
§ 194 comes into play, because as a logical matter the Tribe could not 
have had .. previous possession or ownership .. of the land if it was the 
product of accretion. 
Petrs also attack the application of federal common law. They argue 
that no state boundary issue is involved in this case. As of 1943 Iowa 
and Nebraska have agreed to a permanent boundary line and there is no 
question in this case but that the land at issue is in Iowa. Nor is 
there any showing of conflict between federal policy and state law 
warranting application of federal law. Moreover, according to petrs, 
the CA did not even apply federal law correctly. Their principal complain 
' . 
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is with theCA's holding that the absence of identifiable land in 
place, i.e., land that can be identified as having been severed from 
the opposite bank of the river, is of little probative value in deciding 
the accretion/avulsion issue. It is not the rapidity of the change 
but the character of the change which is important. 
Finally, they claim theCA's conclusion on accretion is contrary 
to the evidence. 
B. Noo 78-161: The State of Iowa emphasizes that it is a state, 
not a white person, and the CA erred in applying the § 194 presumption 
to ito Generally it makes the same arguments as petrs in No. 78-160. 
c. No. 78-162: Petrs in this case focus on what they term§ 194's 
invidious discrimination on the basis of race. They also note that the 
statute is arbitrary, there is no rational link between ownership in 
1867 and ownership in 1977. And since accretion/avulsion issues with 
a 100 year time-frame are simply impossible, the party with the burden 
of proof loseso Therefore, petrs conclude that § 194 is also, for all 
practical purposes, an irrebuttable presumption. Section 194 has 
essentially lain dormant for 140 years, but, according to petrs, it will 
increasingly be resorted to now in Indian land disputes, which have had 
a much publicized resurgence in recent years. Therefore this court shoulc 
subject it to plenary review at this time. They distinguish Mancari, 
supra. There this Court was concerned with a statutory preference 
for Indians as employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. That pre-
ference was obviously rationally related to the activities of BIA. 
- 8 -
D. ResEs: Responses have been filed by the SG and the Omaha 
Indian Tribe. The SG relies on this court's opinions in Mancari, supra, 
and United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977), for the proposition 
that legislation that singles out Indians for special treatment will be 
upheld as long as the special treatment is rati8nally related to 
fulfillment of Congress' unique obligations toward the Indians. Here 
the special obligation is protection of the most valuable asset of 
Congress' Indian wards their land. The SG also argues that the 
§ 194 issue is not ripe for review. This is a case of first impression 
and there is no conflict in the circuits. The constitutionality of § 194 
was only given cursory scrutiny by the courts below. For the same 
reason he would counsel against plenary review of the various statutory 
interpretation·issues raised by petrs. He defends those interpretations 
by invoking the maxim that statutes enacted for the protection of the 
Indians should be liberally con~trued. - See, ~, Bryan v. Itasca 
county, 426 u.s. 373, 392 (1976). He adds that to construe the statute 
to only apply to claims of individual Indians, and not to those of 
tribes, would be to rob the statute of most of its protective qualities, 
since as a general matter whatever title an Indian has is shared with 
the tribe. He also argues that theCA 8's broad reading of "white person 
best comports with the statute's purpose. 
The SG also contends that the CA was correct to apply federal law. 
Although the boundary between Iowa and Nebraska is, as of 1943, governed 
by a compact, the changes at issue in this case occurred before that 
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time, therefore they did linplicate an interstate boundary. Also, citing 
Oneida, supra, he relies on the special federal interest in the pro-
tection of possessory rights to tribal land. The SG also adopts the 
CA's position on the proper characteristics of an avulsion. 
The Tribe argues that the constitutionality of § 194 need not be 
considered in this case. It argues that petrs voluntarily assumed 
the burden of proof because they attempted to show in the trial court 
that the land did not in fact belong to the Tribe. As best as I under-
stand it, this contention seems to be that if a defendant voluntarily 
~ubmits evidence on the ultimate issue at trial, he voluntarily assumes 
the burden of proof. I know of no precedent for that argument and the 
Tribe cites noneo 
In response to the constitutional and statutory challenges to 
theCA's reading of§ 194, the Tribe relies heavily on this Court's 
traditional deference to India~ legislation. The Tribe also questions 
whether Iowa has any land at issue in this caseo 
E. Amici: There are four briefs for Amici Curiae, representing 
30 states, the American Land Title Association, and farm owners in Iowa. 
All were filed in support of petrs. 
4. DISCUSSION: Of t .he numerous issues raised in these petns, some 
are clearly not certworthy. It would be extremely difficult for this 
court to articulate a useful definition of avulsion for purposes of 
federal common law. 
~ · 
The only salutery outcome might be the discarding 
of th~ metaphysics of accretion/avulsion entirely. But this case 
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( essentially involve~urdens of proof, the ' CA found that the DC's 
finding of accretion was erroneous and that the evidence was too 
speculative to draw any conclusion on avulsion or accretion. So it 
does not provide an appropriate vehicle for dealing with the accretion/ 
avulsion issue. 
The argument that § 194 applies only to actions by individual 
Indians, not tribes, is hypertechnical and unconvincing and would 
clearly undermine the protection that section affords. The same is 
true of the DC's argument that the Indians must prove an avulsion before 
§ 194 comes into play at all. The application of federal common law 
is more questionable, but defensible insofar as movements of the Missouri 
during the times at issue (largely. pre-1943) also altered the boundary 
between Nebraska and Iowa. It would not independently warrant cert. 
The constitutional and statutory interpretation challenges to the 
CA' s handling. . of § 194 are substa!ltial. - The CA s definition of "white 
man" is inconsistent with this Court's interpretation of a similar 
phrase in another statute. United States y, Perryman, 100 u.s. 235 
although 
(1880). Andlthis court has time and again upheld legislation that 
singled out Indians for special treatment' ~, United States v . 
Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977); Fisher v. District Court, 424 u.s. 382 
(1976); most of these cases have relied on the special sovereignty 
attributes of the Indian tribe o That logic is not clearly applicable 
to legislation like § 194. 
The preference legislation such as that at issue in Mancari is 
I . 
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most closely analogous. But in Mancari the Court did feel compelled 
to analyze whether the employment preference statute was "directly 
related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal." It found two such 
goals: furthering the cause of Indian self-government and making the 
BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituentgroups. Section 194 
} is more ~r to a statute the court emphasized was not before it in 
l Mancari: a blanket civil service preference for Indians. 
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1. Statutory interpretation of § 194. The SG points out 
that the phrase "white person" in the reiJaration statute considered 
in Perryman had a legislative history that specifically excluded 
blacks from the ambit of the statute. Prior to 1834, the Perryman 
6ourt noted, the statute had made the United States liable for 
injuries to the property of friendly Indians by any person. As 
the Court also noted, in 1834 the Cherokee nation was about to 
remove from Ga. to its new western lands. By restricting the 
coverage of the reparation statute to 11white persons, 11 Congress 
aimed at making the Indians less likely to tolerate fugitive 
black slaves in their country. As the SG points out, there is no 
comparable history of the phrase "white person" in §194. 
2. Constitutionality of § 194. If the § 194 burden 
of proof were applied to a title dispute beuween a single Indian 
and another person over fee land unassociated with an Indian 
reservation, then the case might be analogous to the general 
civil service preference law mentioned in Mancari. But here, 
where the title dispute has to do with part of the Omaha Tribe 1 s 
reservation, I think the special treatment of the Indians is 
jllitifiable by reference to their sovereign status and the history 
~
of relatiOns between them and the United States. 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 19 ... 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
IOWA 
vs. 
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.:illitf"tntt <!fcurt Ltf tfrt ~~ .;§tattg 
Jlfagfri:nghm. ~. <!f. Z.O,?J!.J , 
J US T ICE BYRON R. WHITE November 7, 1978 ~ 
MEMO TO THE CONFERENCE v 
Nos. 78-160, 78-161 & 78-162 
·;f. 
Re: 
Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
Iowa v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
RGP, Inc., v. Ohama Indian Tribe 
The Conference was interested in 
limiting the possible grants in these 
cases to the questions of whether federal 
or state law controlled and whether § 194, 
the burden of proof section, applied against 
a state. With this in mind, the grant in 
No. 78-160 should be limited to question 2, 
which includes the issue whether Iowa should 
be considered a "white person" for the pur-
poses of § 194 and question 3 going to the 
federal-state law issue. In No. 78-161, the 
state's petition, question 1 poses the § 194 
matter and question 4 the controlling law 
issue. No. 78-162 raises neither question 
but perhaps should be held. 
Sincerely yours, 
. -.. _ ........ ·- .................. ' 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 . . . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
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May 29, 1979 
78-160 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
Dear Byron: 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that 
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
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May 30, 1979 
Re: 78-160 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
78-161 - Iowa v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
Dear Byron: 
Although I had originally intended to write 
a dissent, your opinion has convinced me to join. 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice White 
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May 30, 1979 
RE: Nos. 78-160 & 161 Wilson & Iowa v. Omaha Indian 
Tribe 
Dear Byron: 
I was the other way but I give up. Your very 
persuasive opinion carries the day with me. Please 
join me. ; 
• 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART May 31, 1979 
Re: 78-160 and 78-161 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian 
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Dear Byron: 
I am glad to join your opinion for the Court. 
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Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
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May 31, 1979 
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Re: Nos. 78~160 & 161 - Wilson & Iowa v. Omaha 
Indian Tribe 
Dear Byron: 
I give up. Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
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May 31, 1979 
Re: Nos. 78-160 and 78-161 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian 
Tribe, et al. 
Dear Byron: 
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Re: No. 78-160 - Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
No. 78-161 - Iowa _v. Omaha Indian Tribe 
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